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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH,

]

Plaintiff/Respondent,
\

vs.

Case No. 90078-CA

])

MICHAEL ALLEN STERGER,

Priority No. 10

Defendant/Appellant.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
I. JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
A. JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction of this appeal under Rule 5, Rules
of the Utah Court of Appeals and Section 78-2a-3 (2) (e) , Utah Code
Annotated.
B. NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This is an interlocutory appeal from an interlocutory order of
the

Sixth

Judicial

District

Court

for

Garfield

County

denying

Defendant/Appellant1s Motions to Suppress Evidence.
II. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
ISSUE NO. 1;

WAS THE INVENTORY SEARCH AUTHORIZED AND LEGAL

UNDER THE EXISTING CIRCUMSTANCES?
ISSUE NO.

2;

DEFENDANT/APPELLANT

WAS
WHEN

THE BLOOD
THE

AUTHORIZED BY LAW TO TAKE IT?

SAMPLE

PERSONS

LEGALLY

TAKING

THE

TAKEN

FROM

THE

SAME

WERE

NOT

ISSUE

NO.

3:

STATEMENT

THE

WHEN IT

DEFENDANT/APPELLANT

WRONG

WAS

TO

THE

BLOOD

SAMPLE

WAS TAKEN AFTER

LEGALLY

TAKEN

THE OFFICER

DEFENDANT/APPELLANT

REGARDING

OF

THE

HAD MADE A

HIS

BEING

REQUIRED TO SUBMIT TO THE TAKING THEREOF AND PRIOR TO THE IMPLIED
CONSENT LAW COMING INTO EFFECT?
III. CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
CONSIDERED DETERMINATIVE
Fourth Amendment, United States Constitution
Article I, Section 14, Utah State Constitution
Section 41-6-44.10(5)(a), Utah Code Annotated
Section 26-1-30(19) Utah Code Annotated
IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an Interlocutory Appeal
District

Court

for

Garfield

from a ruling of the Sixth

County

overruling

Defendant/Appellant's Motions to Suppress Evidence.

and

denying

Two actions are

pending against Defendant/Appellant in that Court, one consisting of
a criminal prosecution

against him

Possession of a Controlled Substance

alleging

Automobile Homicide,

(Marijuana) and Possession of

Drug Paraphernalia as set forth in the Information, a copy of which
is contained in the Addendum attached hereto and marked as Exhibit
"B".

The criminal action is being prosecuted under Criminal No.

3368, Garfield County District Court.
The second action is a quasi-criminal action wherein the State
of Utah is attempting to forfeit a motor vehicle pursuant to Section
58-37-13, Utah Code Annotated.

Contained in the attached Addendum

and marked as Exhibit "C" is a copy of the documents served upon the
Defendant/Appellant, the said action being identified as Civil No.
3350, Garfield County District Court.
-2-

Motions to Suppress were filed in both actions and as the fact
situation

would

be

the

same

for both, counsel

for both

parties

stipulated that the two cases could be joined for hearing on the
Motions to Suppress,
At the Preliminary Hearing conducted in the Sixth Circuit Court
for Garfield County in the Criminal matter, Defendant/Appellant had
present Byron Ray Christiansen, Jr., Certified Shorthand Reporter,
to report the proceedings.

As there appears to be some dispute in

the facts, counsel for both parties on this Appeal stipulated that
the transcript of that Preliminary Hearing could be included in the
record

on Appeal

so as to

lessen the

risk

of

the matter

being

presented to this Court on a misleading or incorrect statement of
the facts.
At the conclusion of the hearing on the Motions to Suppress,
the Sixth District Court for Garfield County entered its Findings of
Fact

and

Conclusions

Defendant/Appellant's

of

Motions

Law
to

overruling

Suppress.

and

Contained

denying
in

the

Addendum attached hereto and marked as Exhibit "A" is a copy of the
District Court's said Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
that Order, Defendant/Appellant

has

requested

permission

From

to take

this Interlocutory Appeal.
On July 23, 1989, the Defendant/Appellant, his wife, and two
passengers identified as Donald E. Dudrey and Michelle L. Eckroth,
were proceeding in a westerly direction on the Notam Extension of
the Burr Trail in Eastern Garfield County

in a 1989 Ford Bronco

automobile owned by the Defendant/Appellant and his wife, Gina M.

-3-

Sterger

(Transcript

of hearing

on Motion

to

Suppress, Page 46;

Transcript of Preliminary Hearing, Page 17; Addendum, Exhibit "A",
Pages 1 and 2) .

The Stergers were seated in the front seat of the

automobile and Eckroth and Dudrey were in the rear seat with Eckroth
being located directly behind the vehicle driver.

The parties had

enjoyed a vacation on Lake Powell for a week and ten days and were
returning

to

their

respective

homes

in

Southern

California

via

Garfield County and the Burr Trail.
At approximately

6.3 miles West of Utah State Road

276, at

approximately 2:00 p.m., the vehicle in which the said persons were
riding, left the road and collided with an embankment,
Exhibit

"A",

Pages

1 and

2;

Transcript

of

Motion

(Addendum

to

Suppress

Hearing, Page 46; Preliminary Hearing Transcript, Pages 17,18 and
19) which accident apparently resulted in the death of Michelle L.
Eckroth,

although

presented

to

the

satisfactory
Court

as

to

expert
the

evidence
actual

has

cause

not yet been
of

her

death

(Addendum, Exhibit "A", Page 1 and 2 ) .
Subsequent to the accident, the Defendant/Appellant went for
help and found the same and the authorities and a Garfield County
Ambulance arrived at the scene at approximately 2:50 to 3:00 p.m.
(Transcript of Preliminary Hearing, Page 17).
Eckroth, Dudrey and Gina M. Sterger were transported to the
Page, Arizona Hospital by helicopter
2).

(Addendum, Exhibit "A", Page

During the transport or subsequent to their arrival at Page,

Arizona, Eckroth was declared deceased (Addendum, Exhibit "A", Pages
1 and 2) .

The Defendant/Appellant was transported to the Bullfrog,

Utah Clinic, although at the time he had not been placed under
arrest (Addendum, Exhibit "A11, Page 2 ) . Apparently, the reason why
-4--

he was not also taken to Page, Arizona, was because of lack of space
on the helicopter and he appeared to be the least injured of the
four.
had

Prior to his leaving his vehicle on the Notam Extension, he
locked

the

same

and

retained

the

keys

in

his

possession

(Transcript of Motion to Suppress, Page 51).
The
Shawn

officer

Draper,

handling

Deputy

the

Sheriff

Preliminary Hearing, Page 16) .
the

accident

at approximately

investigation
of

Garfield

of

the

County

accident

was

(Transcript

of

Mr. Draper arrived at the scene of
3:00

p.m.,

or one hour

after

the

accident (Preliminary Hearing Transcript, Page 17). As soon as the
persons in the Bronco vehicle, including the Defendant/Appellant,
had left the scene, Deputy Draper proceeded to perform an inventory
search on the subject vehicle

(Transcript of Motion to Suppress,

Pages 48 and 50). This inventory search was performed at the scene
of

the

accident

without

the

Defendant/Appellant

or

any

other

passenger of the vehicle being present and without permission of the
Defendant/Appellant

or

anyone

else

(Transcript

of

Motion

to

Suppress, Pages 50 and 51). At the time, Deputy Draper discovered a
closed

plastic

film

canister

inside

a

brown

camera

case

which

contained marijuana (Transcript of Motion to Suppress Hearing, Pages
55 and 56) .

It is to be noted firstly, that Deputy Draper had to

use some kind of tool to gain access to the Bronco motor vehicle as
it was locked

(Transcript of Motion to Suppress Hearing, Page 51)

and, secondly, neither the subject plastic

film canister nor its

contents could be seen without gaining access to the vehicle and
opening both the plastic film canister and the camera case in which
it was located.
64).

(Transcript of Motion to Suppress Hearing, Page

The vehicle had not been impounded at the time the search was
-5-

commenced, which was at about 6:00

p.m. on the day in question,

(Transcript of Motion to Suppress Hearing, Pages 62 and 64) and at
the time the search was commenced, Mr. Sterger, who was miles away
at the Bullfrog Clinic, had not been placed under arrest (Transcript
of Motion to Suppress Hearing, Page 64) .

Upon finding the plastic

film canister, the inventory search was terminated and the subject
vehicle was removed by wrecker to Deputy Draper's home in Ticaboo,
Utah, some 20 to 30 miles from the scene of the accident where it
was left over the night of July 23-24, 1989 (Transcript of Motion to
Suppress Hearing, Page 65).

It is to be noted that the vehicle was

moved by a wrecker belonging to Hunt's Service of Hanksville, Utah,
and that its driver was not a police officer or other authority
(Transcript of Motion to Suppress Hearing, Page 65) and that the
driver operating the wrecker and taking possession of the subject
vehicle did not sign any inventory
Suppress

Hearing, Pages

65

and

list

66) .

(Transcript of Motion to

Also, the vehicle was

not

placed in any secured impound area while it remained at the home of
Deputy Draper in Ticaboo (Transcript of Motion to Suppress Hearing,
Page 54) .
The following day, July 24, 1989, the subject vehicle was moved
to an impound yard belonging to Hunt's Service at Hanksville, Utah,
and

left

for

further

processing.

Hanksville

is

some

50

to

60

miles from the scene of the accident and some 40 miles from the home
of Deputy Draper in Ticaboo, Utah (Transcript of Motion to Suppress
Hearing, Page 70).
Two days after the accident, Deputy Draper went to the impound
yard at Hanksville and completed his inventory
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search

(Transcript

of Motion to Suppress Hearing, Page 71; Transcript of Preliminary
Hearing, Page
type"

46) .

plastic

containing

container

what

Paraphernalia,

At that time, he

he

in

the

rear

of

in

his

described

seeds,

Zig

Zag

Preliminary Hearing, Page 47) .

found a closed
the

Bronco

report
etc.11.

papers,

"Tupperware
automobile

as

"...Drug

(Transcript

of

There were other closed containers

in the subject vehicle consisting of canned foods, food boxes and
items of like nature, which Deputy Draper did not open and inspect
(Transcript

of

Motion

to

Suppress

Hearing,

Pages

73

and

74;

searches of

the

Transcript of Preliminary Hearing, Page 26).
The

authorities

do

not claim

that the two

Bronco motor vehicle were made under
incident to an arrest.

authority

of

a warrant

or

Rather, they claim that the searches were

inventory searches made pursuant to Garfield County's standardized
guidelines, a copy of which is contained in the Addendum attached as
Exhibit " D " ) .
The

Garfield

County

standardized

police

guidelines, as

set

forth in Section 4.05, do not authorize inventory searches unless
the vehicle to be searched has been impounded, do not provide for
bifurcated
vehicle

inventory

changes

from

searches,
one

require

person

to

that

another,

when
the

custody
person

of

a

taking

custody shall place his or her signature on the inventory list and
require that a written inventory shall be made of all contents of
the vehicle, both in opened, closed and/or locked containers.
During the course of events and at some time while he was being
transported

to the Page, Arizona Hospital or subsequent thereto,

Donald L. Dudrey, one of the passengers in the Bronco vehicle at the

-7-

time of the accident, began making
that

the

morning

Defendant/Appellant

of

accident.

the accident

had

and was

statements to the authorities

been

consuming

intoxicated

alcohol

on

the

at the time of the

At the scene of the accident, Deputy Draper had smelled

blood on the Defendant/Appellant, but stated that he had not smelled
alcohol (Transcript of Preliminary Hearing, Page 81).
At approximately

6:30

p.m., on July 23, 1989, Deputy Draper

left the scene of the accident and drove to the Bullfrog Clinic,
some 10 miles distant.

Upon arrival at the Clinic, Deputy Draper

contacted the Garfield County sheriff and the Sheriff directed him
to

take

a

blood

test

of

the

Defendant/Appellant

Preliminary Hearing, Pages 43 and 44).

(Transcript

of

At approximately 7:00 p.m.

on the date in question, Deputy Draper told Mr. Sterger, in words to
the effect, that ". . . he was required to submit to a blood test
since he was

the driver

of the vehicle

resulting in the death of a passenger"
Hearing,

Pages

44

and

74).

submitted to the blood test.
sample

at

approximately

placed under arrest.

The

involved

in an

accident

(Transcript of Preliminary

Defendant/Appellant

thereupon

Subsequent to the taking of the blood

9:20

p.m.,

the

Defendant/Appellant

was

The analysis of the blood sample taken from

the Defendant/Appellant showed no alcohol as being present but did
show

"Blood

nanograms

per

THC

(the

active

milliliter

ingredient

and

Blood

in

COOH-THC

marijuana)
Metabolite

of
of

2.6
28

nanograms per milliliter (Addendum, attached as Exhibit " E " ) .
The blood test taken of the Defendant/Appellant was taken by
one

Peter

Hollis

and

one

Pat

Quinn

(Transcript

of

Preliminary

Hearing, Page 44 and Transcript of Motion to Suppress Hearing, Pages
6

and

14).

Mr.

Hollis

is

a

so-called
-8-

"Physician1s

Assistant"

(Transcript of Motion to Suppress Hearing, Page 6) and Mr. Quinn is
a

Park

Ranger

Hearing, Pages

and Park Medic
13 and

14).

(Transcript

of Motion

to

Suppress

Apparently, Mr. Hollis commenced

to

attempt to take a blood sample, but each time he attempted to insert
the needle into Mr. Sterger1s vein, the vein collapsed.

This was

done several times (Transcript of Motion to Suppress Hearing, Page
14) .

Thereupon, Mr. Quinn inserted the needle into a vein of Mr.

Sterger

that did not collapse and Mr. Hollis withdrew the blood

(Transcript of Motion to Suppress Hearing, Page 14) .

Neither Mr.

Hollis nor Mr. Quinn was a physician, registered nurse, or practical
nurse as required by Section 41-6-44.10 (5) (a) , Utah Code Annotated
and neither had been issued a permit to draw blood by the Utah
Department of Health under Section 26-1-30(19), Utah Code Annotated,
and as set forth in Section 41-6-44.10 U.C.A. (Transcript of Motion
to Suppress Hearing, Pages 17, 18, and 30).
The Defendant/Appellant filed two Motions to Suppress in the
criminal case filed against him (Criminal No. 3368, Garfield County
District Court), the first asking the Court to suppress any evidence
taken

from the Ford Bronco on the basis of an illegal inventory

search and the second asking the Court to suppress the results of
the blood test taken from the Defendant/Appellant on the basis of
(1) that the blood sample was taken by persons not authorized by
Sections 41-6-44.10(5)(a) and 26-1-30(19), Utah Code Annotated and;
(2) that the officer had made a false statement of the law to Mr.
Sterger to force him to allow the taking of the blood sample and
further, that at the time of taking the blood sample, Mr. Sterger
had not been placed under arrest and therefore, the "Implied Consent
Law" of Utah (41-6-44.10 U.C.A.) was not applicable.
-9-

In addition, the Defendant/Appellant filed a Motion to Suppress
in the
Ford

civil

Bronco

forfeiture
vehicle

case

(Civil

filed
No.

against

3350,

Defendant/Appellant's

Garfield

County

District

Court) on the basis that the inventory search of the vehicle was an
illegal inventory search and therefore, the evidence taken from the
vehicle

and

suppressed.

to be used

in the

civil

forfeiture

case

should

be

It was stipulated by counsel before the Court, that all

three Motions to Suppress in both the civil and criminal cases would
be heard at the same time so as to save time in view of the fact
that the same fact situation would exist in both cases.
Upon the hearing of the three Motions to Suppress, the Sixth
District Court for Garfield County overruled and denied all three of
them

(See Addendum, attached Exhibit "A") and

Defendant/Appellant

filed his Petition for Interlocutory Appeal from that Order.

The

Order was filed with the Clerk of the Garfield County District Court
on February 1, 1990.
V. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
As

Defendant/Appellant

sees

it,

the

inventory

search(s)

performed on his motor vehicle fail to meet the standards of the
Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Article I, Section 14
of the Utah State Constitution and the cases construing the same for
several reasons.

They are as follows:

Firstly, Garfield

County

did

not have, at the

time of

the

subject incident, any standardized police guideline directing

its

officers as to when and under what conditions they were to impound a
motor vehicle.

-10-

Secondly,

the

existing

guidelines did not provide

Garfield

County

standardized

for or authorize bifurcated

police

inventory

searches.
Thirdly, at the time of commencement of the subject inventory
search on the "Burr Trail", the scene of the accident, the motor
vehicle to be searched had not been impounded.
Fourthly, when custody of the subject motor vehicle was changed
from the investigating officer to the wrecker-driver, the wreckerdriver did not place his signature on the inventory list as required
by the existing Garfield County standardized police guidelines.
Fifthly,

the

Garfield

County

standardized

police

guidelines

require that a written inventory be made -of all contents of the
vehicle, both in opened, closed and/or locked containers and the
officer making the inventory

search(s) opened

some closed

and/or

locked containers located in the subject vehicle and did not open
others, thereby exercising discretion not permitted by either the
Garfield

County

standardized

police guidelines

or the

applicable

law.
The blood test taken of the Defendant/Appellant was not taken
pursuant to the applicable law.

Neither person involved in taking

the blood

to do so by applicable

sample was authorized

law.

In

addition, the officer ordering the test made a false statement of
the

law

to

the

Defendant/Appellant

to

force

or

trick

him

into

allowing the test and in any event, the "Implied Consent Law" was
not in effect at the time; the Defendant/Appellant not being under
arrest at the time.

-11-

VI. DETAIL OF THE ARGUMENT
A. WAS THE INVENTORY
EXISTING CIRCUMSTANCES?

SEARCH AUTHORIZED AND LEGAL UNDER THE

While we are dealing with two separate cases, one consisting of
a criminal prosecution against Defendant/Appellant and the other a
civil or quasi-criminal action to forfeit a motor vehicle, it is
clear

that

evidence

the

constitutional

obtained

applicable

to

through

both

rule

an

requiring

unlawful

proceedings.

One

the

search
1958

exclusion

of

seizure

is

and

Plymouth

Sedan

vs.

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, (1965) 380 U.S. 693, 14 L. Ed. 2d, 170
85 S. Ct. 1246.

Counsel for both parties stipulated that the record

made would be applicable to both proceedings.
The

Fourth

impounded

following

alcohol and
showing

Amendment

is

not

violated

where

the

vehicle

is

an arrest for driving under the influence of

its contents are inventoried,where

that

a

police, who

following

(1) there was no

standardized

procedures,

acted in bad faith or for the sole purpose of investigation; (2)
that the police were potentially responsible for the property taken
into

their

custody;

(3)

that

local

police

procedures

governing

inventory searches mandated the opening of closed containers and the
listing of their contents; and (4) that those procedures established
standardized

criteria

to

govern

an

officer's

choice

impounding a vehicle and simply parking and locking it.

between
COLORADO

vs. BERTINE, (1987), 479 U.S. 367, 93 L.Ed. 2d 739, 107 S. Ct. 738.
Inventories of any sort of container, such as an automobile, made
pursuant to standard police procedures with respect to containers
taken by

the police

in custody

are

-12-

a reasonable

search.

South

Dakota vs. Opperman, (1976) 428 U.S. 364, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1000, 96 S.
Ct. 3092.
On the other hand, the standardized

police procedures under

which a warrantless inventory search is conducted must exist and the
inventory

search

must

be

conducted

pursuant

to

State of Utah vs. Shamblin, (1988) 763 P.2d 425

their

mandates.

(Utah App. 1988).

The Utah Court of Appeals made the following statement in Shamblin:
"With a standardized, mandatory
procedure, the
minister's picnic basket and grandmafs knitting bag are
opened and inventoried right along with the biker's tool
box and the gypsy's satchel".
In Bertine at page 747 in a footnote, Justice Rehnquist made the
following statement:
"We emphasize that, in this case, the trial court
found that the police department's procedures mandated the
opening of closed containers and the listing of their
contents.
Our decisions have always adhered to the
requirement that inventories be conducted according to
standardized criteria. See Lafayette, 462 U.S. at 648, 77
L. Ed. 2d 65, 103 S. Ct. 2605; Opperman, 428 U.S. at
374-375, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1000, 96 S. Ct. 3092".
In Bertine, Justice Powell, joined by Justice O'Connor and
Justice Blackmum, made the following statement:
"The Court today holds that police officers may open
closed containers while conducting a routine inventory
search of an impounded vehicle.
I join the Court's
opinion, but write separately to underscore the importance
of having such inventories conducted only pursuant to
standardized police procedures. The underlying rational
for allowing
an inventory exception to the Fourth
Amendment warrant rule is that police officers are not
vested with discretion to determine the scope of the
inventory search. . . This absence of discretion ensures
that inventory searches will not be used as a purposeful
and general means of discovering evidence of crime. Thus,
it is permissible for police officers to open closed
containers in an inventory search only if they are
following standard police procedures that mandate the
opening of such containers in every impounded vehicle."
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Garfield Countyfs police procedures (See Addendum, Exhibit "D"
attached) are silent as to any standardized criteria to govern an
officer's choice between impounding a vehicle and simply parking and
locking
making

it

(See Bertine above) .

any provision

Further, they are silent as to

for a bifurcated

search with the first and

second parts taking place miles apart and after the passage of two
day's time during which the custody of the vehicle changed hands and
was not under police control, at least during part of that time,
and during a portion of that time was parked outside an impound lot
without supervision or control overnight.
Garfield County's procedures mandate that "A written inventory
shall be made of all contents of the vehicle, both in opened, closed
and/or locked containers".

The County's standardized procedures do

not make any exception as to the opening of "closed and/or locked
containers" although in this case, the searching officer did not
open

all

closed

and/or

locked containers

located

in the

subject

vehicle.
The County's standardized procedures are silent as to when and
under

what

circumstances

a vehicle

is

to be

impounded,

thereby

leaving that to the discretion of the officer.
When custody of a vehicle is changed, the County's standardized
procedures

require

inventory list.

that

certain

signatures

be

affixed

to

an

This was not done in this case.

The law requires that before the inventory search exception to
the Fourth Amendment becomes applicable, the vehicle to be searched
must have been impounded.

In this case, the search was commenced

prior to impoundment.
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Discretion

by

the

officer

as

to what

closed

and/or

containers were to be opened was present in this case.

locked
This is

impermissible*
Shamblin and the other cases cited above require that not only
must the

standardized

police procedures

exist, but they must be

followed.
The inventory search of Defendant/Appellantfs motor vehicle was
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 14,
of the Utah State Constitution and the cases construing the same.
As a result, the evidence unlawfully taken therein must be ordered
suppressed.
B.
WAS
THE
BLOOD
DEFENDANT/APPELLANT WHEN THE
AUTHORIZED BY LAW TO TAKE IT?

SAMPLE
PERSONS

LEGALLY
TAKEN
FROM
TAKING THE SAME WERE

THE
NOT

Section 41-6-44.10(5)(a) Utah Code Annotated, reads as follows:
"(5)(a) Only a physician, registered nurse, practical
nurse, or person authorized under Subsection 26-1-30(19),
acting at the request of a peace officer, may withdraw
blood to determine the alcoholic or drug content. This
limitation does not apply to the taking of a urine or
breath specimen."
Section 26-1-30(19) Utah Code Annotated, reads as follows:
11

(19)
establish
qualifications
for
individuals
permitted to draw blood pursuant to Section 41-6-44.10,
and to issue permits to individuals it finds qualified,
which permits may be terminated or revoked by the
department;11
Peter

Hollins

and

Pat

Quinn, the

persons

taking

the

blood

samples from Defendant/Appellant at the Bullfrog Clinic, were not
authorized

by

the

Department

of

Health

to

take

blood

Neither

of them was a physician, registered

nurse.

In addition, neither had been issued a permit to take blood
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nurse, or

samples.
practical

by the Utah Department of Health,
authorized

by

applicable

As neither Hollins nor Quinn was

statutes

to

take

blood

under

the

circumstances existing, the blood sample of Defendant/Appellant was
illegally taken and the Court should order the results of the test
made on the sample so taken suppressed.
At the hearing

of the Motions to Suppress before the Trial

Court, counsel for Plaintiff/Respondent cited the Utah case of Gibb
vs. Dorius (Utah 1975) 533 P. 2d 199 as standing for the proposition
that

a

so-called

"physician's

assistant" was

blood under Section 41-6-44.10 U.C.A.

authorized

to

take

At the time of Gibb, Section

41-6-44.10 (f) , Utah Code Annotated, read as follows:
"Only a physician, registered nurse, practical^nurse
or duly authorized laboratory technician, acting at the
request of a police officer can withdraw blood for the
purpose of determining the alcoholic or drug content
therein. . . any physician, registered nurse, practical
nurse or duly authorized laboratory technician^ who^_ at
the direction of a police officer, draws a sample of blood
from any person whom the peace officer has reason to
believe is driving in violation of this chapter, or
hospital or medical facility at which such sample is
drawn, shall be immune from any civil or criminal
liability
arising therefrom, provided
such test is
administered according to standard medical practice."
Based upon the words "duly authorized
the Utah

Supreme

"physician1s

Court

assistant"

in Gibb
could

stated

laboratory technician"

that

withdraw

in

blood

certain
under

cases

a

Section

41-6-44.10 U.C.A.
As is to be noted, Section 41-6-44.10 U.C.A. has been amended
since Gibb was decided

and the words "duly authorized

technician" taken from the statute.
under

Subsection

26-1-30(19)" were
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laboratory

The words "person authorized
substituted

therefor.

We

are

therefore dealing with an entirely different statute than that under
which

Gibb was

decided

and

the

intent

of

the

legislature

seems

clear.
It is submitted that as the blood sample taken from Defendant/
Appellant was

taken by unauthorized

persons, the results

of the

analysis of that sample are not properly to be admitted as evidence
against Defendant/Appellant.
C.
WAS
THE
BLOOD
SAMPLE
LEGALLY
TAKEN
OF
THE
DEFENDANT/APPELLANT WHEN IT WAS TAKEN AFTER THE OFFICER HAD MADE A
WRONG STATEMENT TO THE DEFENDANT/APPELLANT REGARDING HIS BEING
REQUIRED TO SUBMIT TO THE TAKING THEREOF AND PRIOR TO THE IMPLIED
CONSENT LAW COMING INTO EFFECT?
Section

41-6-44.10, Utah

Code

Annotated

reads

in

part

as

follows:
"(2) (a) If the person has been placed under arrest,
and has then been requested by a peace officer to submit
to any one or more of the chemical tests under Subsection
(1), and refuses to submit to the chemical test or any one
or all of the tests requested...".
Based

upon

this provision of the

statute, the Utah

Supreme

Court in State of Utah vs. Cruz (Utah 1968) 21 Utah 2d 406, 446 P.2d
307 held
U.C.A.)

that under the implied
implied

consent

of

consent

persons

law

(Section

operating

motor

41-6-44.10

vehicles

to

submit to chemical tests for purposes of determining alcohol content
of their blood arises only on arrest, and prior to arrest, actual
consent must be obtained.
Deputy Draper told Defendant/Appellant that he "was required to
submit to a blood test since he was the driver of a vehicle involved
in

an

accident

resulting

in

Defendant/Appellant

thereupon

statement

officer

of

the

the

death

submitted
was

made

to

a

the

prior

Defendant/Appellant was placed under arrest.
-17-

of

passenger".
blood

to

the

The

test. This
time

the

The

statement

of

accordance with law.

Deputy

Draper

was

not

correct

and

in

As far as counsel for Defendant/Appellant is

aware, no such statement is authorized by law.

The problem is that

it placed force and coercion upon the Defendant/Appellant whether
the

statement

authorized

was

by

true

law.

As

or
a

not

and,

result,

in

it

fact, no

cannot

be

such
found

force
that

is
the

Defendant/Appellant freely gave his permission to draw blood and as
the same was taken by force, not authorized by law, the analysis of
the

sample

taken

must

not

be

allowed

as

evidence

against

Defendant/Appellant.
VII. CONCLUSION CONTAINING A STATEMENT OF
THE RELIEF SOUGHT
For

the

reasons

Defendant/Appellant1s

stated,

the

evidence

taken

from

motor vehicle and the results of the blood

sample taken from his body were taken illegally.
The Court should reverse the decision of the District Court of
Garfield County wherein

it refused to suppress the evidence.

It

should further order that such evidence be suppressed and not be
usable at trial.

DATED this JO

day of M f , 1990.

.iip L. xFoi-emaster
srney/for Defendant/Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILINC

fr

da
I hereby certify that on t h i s
) ^
Y °^ Zv&Y, 1990, I
mailed four true and correct copies? of the foregoing Brief of
Appellant to Ms. Christine F
Soltis, Assistant Utah Attorney
General, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114.
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ADDENDUM

Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
Article I, Section 14, Constitution of Utah:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall
not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause
supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the person or thing to be seized,
Utah Code Annotated, Section 41-6-44,10(5)(a);
(5) (a) Only a physician, registered nurse, practical nurse, or
person authorized under Subsection 26-1-30(19), acting .at the
request of a peace officer, may withdraw blood to determine the
alcoholic or drug content. This limitation does hot apply to the
taking of a urine or breath specimen.
Utah Code Annotated, Section 26-1-30(19):
(19) Establish qualifications for individuals permitted to draw
blood pursuant to Section 41-6-44.10, and to issue permits to
individuals it finds qualified, which permits may be terminated or
revoked by the department.

. XJ J- X

VaAhNKUJ WUUINI Y

C\

NO. ^&lk&~
WALLACE A. LEE 115306
Garfield County Attorney
55 South Main Street
Panguitch, Utah 84759
Telephone: 67 6-229 0
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IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF GARFIELD COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

vs.
MICHAEL ALLEN STERGER,

Criminal No. 3368
Civil No. 3350

Defendant
This matter having come on regularly for hearing before
the above-entitled Court, Don V. Tibbs District Judge presiding,
on January 4, 1990, on defendant's Motions to Suppress and
Defendant being personally present before the Court and
represented by his attorney Phillip L. Foremaster, and the State
of Utah being represented by Wallace A. Lee, Garfield County
Attorney, and certain witnesses having been sworn and having
testified, and certain exhibits having been submitted to the
Court, and the Court being fully advised in the premises, now
makes and enters its1 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as
follows:
FINDINGS OF FACT

1.

FILED

Defendant, Michael Allen Sterger, was the alleged

driver of a vehicle involved in a collision on the Notam part of
the Burr Trail in Eastern Garfield County in which Michelle

Cleri

ckroth was injured.

The collision occurred on July 23, 1989,

nd Michelle Eckroth allegedly later died of injuries sustained
n the collision.
2.

Deputy Shawn Draper is a Garfield County Deputy

heriff, and is the investigating officer in this case.

Deputy

raper is the only deputy sheriff covering the remote, area of
astern Garfield County.
3.

After the collision, the said Michelle Eckroth, the

efendant and two other passengers in the defendants1 vehicle
ere transported from the scene by ambulance and were taken to
ullfrog Clinic where all but the defendant were air lifted in a
elicopter to Page Hospital.

Defendants vehicle was left

nattended, and partially blocking one lane of the road, creating
potential danger to the safety of people traveling on the road.
4.

Deputy Draper impounded defendant's vehicle due to

is concern for public safety, and since defendant and every one
f his party had been transported away from the scene, there were
o alternative arrangements which could be made for revoval of
he vehicle.
5.

After impounding the vehicle, at the scene of the

ollision, Deputy Draper began conducting an inventory search of
he vehicle, for purposes of protecting himself and the Garfield
ounty Sheriff's Department from possible liability for valuables
nside the vehicle.

In conducting the inventory search, Deputy

raper substantially complied with regularized procedures of the
arfield County Sheriff's Department.

As a result of this

nventory search, Deputy Draper seized a black film canister
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containing a green leafy substance later analyzed and determined
to be marijuana.
6.

Deputy Draper did not continue his inventory of the

vehicle at the scene, because he was notified that Michelle
Eckroth had died, and another passenger in the vehicle was
accusing the defendant of drinking.

Deputy Draper felt compelled

to interrupt the inventory to go to Bullfrog Clinic to draw
defendant's blood for a determination of alcohol content.

There

were no other Sheriff's deputies in the area that could have
assisted Deputy Draper.
7.

Defendant's car was towed to Deputy Draper's

residence, in Ticaboo, Utah, by Karl Hunt arid was secured.
8.

Defendant was at the Bullfrog Clinic when Deputy

Draper arrived.

Defendant had not been transported to Page by

helicopter with the other passengers of the vehicle and Michelle
Eckroth, due to lack of space in the helicopter.
9.

Bullfrog Clinic is a satellite clinic of Good

Samaritan Hospital Corporation in Phoenix, Arizona, and is built
on National Park Service land within the Glen Canyon National
Recreation Area, pursuant to a Memorandum of Understanding with
the National Park Service.
10.

The .internal policy of the Bullfrog Clinic and

Good Samaritan, permits staff physician's assistants of the
Bullfrog Clinic to draw blood for investigative purposes at the
request of a law enforcement officer, and with the consent of the
patient.
11.

Defendant was told by Deputy Draper that he was
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required to submit to a blood test since he was the driver of a
vehicle involved in an accident resulting in the death of a
passenger.

Defendant submitted to the blood test.
12.

Prior to drawing the blood, additional consent of

the defendant was obtained by Bullfrog Clinic Physicianfs Assistant Peter Hollis.
13.

Peter Hollis is licensed as a Physician's Assis-

tant by the State of Utah to practice under the supervision and
direction of Dr. Dennis Little, a physician licensed in the State
of Utah, and on the staff of Good Samaritcin Hospital in Page,
Arizona. Dr. Little was not present at the* time the blood was
taken, nor was there any consultation with Dr. Little.
14.

Peter Hollis is trained and qualified to perform

venipuncture for purposes of drawing blood, by college training
in the Yale University Physician's Assistantprogram, and by
experience in a clinical setting.
15.

Venipuncture, including drawing of blood, is a

regular part of Peter Hollis1 activities as a physician's assistant at Bullfrog Clinic.
16.

Peter Hollis was assisted in drawing the defen-

dant's' blood by Pat Quinn, National Park Service Park Medic.
17.

Pat Quinn is a National Park Service certified

Level 5 Park Medic, and is trained and qucilified to conduct
venipuncture and draw blood.
18.

Pat Quinn regularly draws blood in a clinical

setting as part of his normal activities as a Park Medic, and
regularly assists the physician's assistant at the-Bullfrog
Clinic, and acts under his supervision.
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The National Park

Service has adopted policy guidelines which allow Level 5 certified Park Medics to conduct venipuncture.

Local Glen Canyon

Office orders also allow Level 5 certified Park Medics to conduct
venipuncture.
19.

Prior to attempting to insert a needle to draw

blood from defendant's veins, Physician's Assistant Peter Hollis
and Park Medic Pat Quinn cleansed the defendant's skin with
Betadine solution and water rather than alcohol, as a precaution
to avoid any possible taint of alcohol in the sample.
20.

Peter Hollis twice attempted to insert a catheter

for withdrawal of defendant's blood, but both times collapsed
defendant's vein.

He then requested Park Medic Pat Quinn to

attempt to find a vein.

Pat Quinn was successful in inserting a

catheter into defendant's vein, Peter Hollis then withdrew-the
blood -af defendant, inserted it into two vials, enclosed the
vials in a plastic bag and gave them directly to Deputy Shawn
Draper.
21.

Peter Hollis and Pat Quinn followed standard

medical procedures in withdrawing defendant's blood, in sanitary
conditions at the Bullfrog Clinic, and took every precaution to
obtain a proper blood sample.
22.
Burr Trail

Due to the remoteness of the area surrounding the

and the Bullfrog area, the Bullfrog Clinic was the

only reasonable facility where defendant could have been taken
for blood to be drawn. The closest alternative facility was
approximately 2 hours away.
23.

Approximately

two (2) days later, after
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investigating the scene of the accident, and transporting the
defendant to Koosharem,Utah, Deputy Draper returned to finish his
inventory of defendant's vehicle, and the vehicle was moved
approximately sixty (60) miles to Hanksville, Utah, and placed in
the State impound yard.
24.

Prior to resuming his inventory, Deputy Draper

contacted Garfield County Sheriff Robert V. Judd, who indicated
that defendant's vehicle had been seized by the State of Utahr
due to the marijuana found in the first inventory and there was
no need to obtain a search warrant to resume the inventory.
25.

Deputy Draper continued his inventory for the

purpose of protecting himself and Garfield County Sheriff Department from liability for valuables inside defendant's vehicle.
26.

During the resumed inventory procedure, Deputy

-Draper seized a tupperware container containing items later
analyzed to be drug paraphernalia.
27.

The inventory search of the defendant's vehicle

was reasonable and essentially in conformance with Garfield
County inventory procedures.
From the foregoing facts, the Court makes and enters
it's conclusions of law as follows:

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1.

Section 41-6-44.10 (5) (a), states that only a

physician, registered nurse, 'practical nurse, or person
authorized under subsection 26-1-30 (19), acting at the request
of a peace officer, may withdraw blood to determine the alcoholic
or drug content.
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2.

The Court finds that the Utah Supreme Court, in the

case of Gibb v. Dorius, 533 P2d 299 (1975), in interpreting the
predecessor to the current statute which is substantially similar
to the current Section 41-6-44.10 (5) (a), expressly found that
the drawing of blood from a human being constitutes the practice
of medicine and "falls within the purview of service rendered by
a physician's assistant.... acting under the supervision and
direction of a physician."
3.

In this case, due to the circumstances of the

remote location, lack of reasonable alternative facilities to
draw the blood, and due to the fact that the blood was drawn by a
State licensed physician's assistant acting under the supervision
and direction of a licensed physician and a certified Park Medic,
fully trained and qualified to draw blood, since conducting
venipuncture is a routine part of their respective positions,
since Bullfrog Clinic and National Park Service policies permit
the drawing of blood, since standard medical procedures were
followed in sanitary environments, and all precautions were taken
to avoid any possible contamination of the blood sample, the
Court finds that the physician's assistant, Peter Hollis, and
Park Medic, Pat Quinn, were qualified to draw defendant's blood,
and the resulting blood samples were properly obtained and should
not be suppressed as evidence.
4.

The Court finds that the defendant twice voluntari-

ly gonsented to having his blood drawn.
5.

The Court finds there was reasonable and proper

justification for impoundment of defendant's vehicle for public
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safety reasons, and further finds that the inventory search
resulting in the seizure of marijuana and drug paraphernalia was
reasonable, and essentially in conformance with a regularized set
of procedures which adequately guarded against arbitrariness.
6,

The Court finds that Deputy Draper acted in good

faith, in conducting the inventory search of defendant's vehicle
with a purpose of protecting himself and the Garfield County
Sherifffs Department from liability for valuables inside the
vehicle.
In accordance with the foregoing Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law, the Court finds that defendant's Motions to
Suppress the blood sample taken from the defendant and to- suppress items removed from defendant's vehicle pursuant to Deputy
Draper's inventory search should be denied.
DATED this 1st day of February, 1990.
BY THE COURT:

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a full, true and col^s^ct copy of
the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW was placed
in thei United States Mail, postage prepaid, on this the 1st day
of February, 1990, addressed as follows:
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Mr, Phillip L. Foremaster
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 572
St* George, Utah 84770

Secretary
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WALLACET A. LEE #5306
Garfield County Attorney
55 South Main Street
Panguitch, Utah 84759
Telephone: 676-2290
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF GARFIELD COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,

)

Plaintiff,

;

INFORMATION

]i

Criminal No.

vs.
MICHAEL ALLEN STERGER,

3 3J7 tf

Defendant.
The undersigned, Wallace A. Lee, under oath states on information and belief that the Defendant committed the crimes of:
COUNT I:

AUTOMOBILE HOMICIDE, a Second Degree Felony,

Ln violation of Utah Code Annotated Section 76-5-207, in that, in
Sarfield County, State of Utah, on or about the 23rd day of July,
.989, he did operate a motor vehicle while having a blood alcohol
:ontfent of .08% or greater by wejLgjxt< or while under the influence
>f alcohol or any drug, or the combined influence of alcohol and
m y drug, to a degree which rendered him incapable of safely operating
he vehicle and caused the death of another by operating the motor
ehicle in a criminally negligent manner.
COUNT II:

POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE (MARIJUANA),

Class B Misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Annotated Section
8-37-8 (2) (a) (i), in that, in Garfield County, State of Utah,
n or about the 23rd day of July, 1989, he did knowingly and inten-

State vs. Sterger
INFORMATION
Page 2

tionally possess a controlled substance, to-wit:
COUNT III:

Marijuana.

POSSESSION OF DRUG PARAPHERNALIA, a Class B

Misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Annotated Section 58-37a-5,
m

that, in Garfield County, State of Utah, on or about the 23rd

day of July, 1989, he did use or possess with the intent to use,
drug paraphernalia ±_o ingest, inhale, or otherwise introduce a controlled
substance into the human body.
This Information is based upon evidence obtained from the
following witness:

Shawn Draper,

COMPLAINANT
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 31st day of October,
1989.

v\(\/m(i,\J
Notary Public
Residing at:

Panguitch, Utah

My Commission Expires:
2-25-1990

r

Authorized for presentment and filing:

County Attorney
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PATRICK B. NOLAN
Garfield County Attorney
WALLACE A. LEE
Deputy Garfield County Attorney
55 South Main Street
Panguitch, Utah 84759
Telephone: 67 6-2290
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF GARFIELD COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

"HE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

SUMMONS AND NOTICE OF
SEIZURE AND INTENDED
FORFEITURE

s•
ICHAEL ALLEN STERGER; and
ne 1989 Ford Bronco, Serial
o. 1FMEU15HXKLA39366, bearing
alifornia License No. 2MRX883,

Civil NO.A3 5 Q

Defendant.
3:

MICHAEL ALLEN STERGER
5712 Myra
Cyprus, California 90630
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the State of Utah has seized

1989 Ford Bronco, Serial No. 1FMEU15HXKLA39366, bearing California
cense No. 2MRX883.
NOTICE IS FURTHER GIVEN that the State of Utah intends to
oceed with forfeiture of said vehicle, pursuant to the provisions
Utah Code Annotated Section 58-37-13.
You are hereby summoned, and required to file an Answer,
writing to the attached Verified Complaint, with the Clerk of the
)ve-entitled Court;

and to serve upon, or mail to WALLACE A, LEE,

>uty Garfield County Attorney, 55 South Main Street, Panguitch,
ih, 84759, a copy of said Answer, within 20 days after service

State vs. Sterger
SUMMONS AND NOTICE OF
SEIZURE AND INTENDED FORFEITURE
Page 2

of this Summons and Notice upon you.
If you fail to do so, judgment by default will be taken
against you for the relief demanded in said Verified Complaint, which
has been filed with the Clerk of said Court, and a copy of which is
hereto annexed and herewith served upon you.
DATED this Jls6

day of July, 1989.

V H

WALLACE A. LEE
Deputy Garfield County Attorney

GARFIELD COUNTT SHERIFFS DEPARTMENT

l»ti» RPP

7-P- S- 5 ^ .

Thnn RPfl

/

^^tT

EttaD Served
J^Tlmft^nrvad
Served ,. ,, 1~%%
/ £ £ aS-4^Time^cryad
/C /0</^
Pcrsson served
^UXlC%a^^hJ^
Officer,
Atcinpts: 1st
2nd
3rd.
Remarks
,
—
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PATRICK B. NOLAN
Garfield County Attorney
WALLACE A. LEE
Deputy County Attorney
55 South Main Street
Panguitch, Utah 84759
Telephone:
67 6-2290

IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF GARFIELD COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

VERIFIED COMPLAINT

r

s.

ICHAEL ALLEN STERGER; and
;>
ne 1989 Ford Bronco, Serial
o. 1FMEU15HXKLA39366, bearing
alifornia License No. 2MRX883,

Civil No. 3350

Defendants.
FATE OF UTAH

)
: ss.
)UNTY OF GARFIELD )

Plaintiff, THE STATE OF UTAH, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated
ction 58-37-13, alleges as follows:
1.

On or about July 24, 1989, in Garfield County, State

Utah, the Garfield County Sheriff's Office seized the following
scribed vehicle registered to Michael and Gina Sterger of Cyprus,
Lifornia:
One 1989 Ford Bronco, Serial No. 1FMEU15HXKLA39366, bearing
ifornia License No. 2MRX883.
2.
mes of:

Defendant MICHAEL ALLEN STERGER, is charged with the
AUTOMOBILE HOMICIDE, a Second Degree Felony; POSSESSION

A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE, a Class B Misdemeanor; and, POSSESSION

State vs. Sterger
VERIFIED COMPLAINT
Page 2

OF DRUG PARAPHERNALIA, a Class B Misdemeanor.
3.

A controlled substance (Marijuana) and drug paraphernalia

were seized from within the above-described vehicle, incident to the
defendantf s
4.

The basis for such seizure is that said vehicle

was being used or

intended for use for the transportation, receipt,

possession or concealment of controlled substances.
WHEREFORE, THE STATE OF UTAH prays that the Court enter
judgment against the defendant MICHAEL ALLEN STERGER as follows:
1.

That the Court adjudge and decree that the above-described

vehicle was used or was intended for use, to transport, or to facilitate
the transporation, sale, receipt, possession or concealment of said
controlled substance.
2.

That the Court adjudge and decree that the defendant,

MICHAEL ALLEN STERGER, has no right, title or interest in or to the
above-described vehicle•
3.

That the above-described vehicle be forfeited to the

State of Utah, and awarded to Garfield County.
4.

That THE STATE OF UTAH be awarded such other and further

relief as to the Court may seem just and equitable in the premises,
DATED this

7J%

day of July, 1989

WALLACE: A : LEE
Deputy Garfield County Attorney
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State vs. Sterger
VERIFIED COMPLAINT
Page 3

VERIFICATION
STATE OF UTAH
ss.
COUNTY OF GARFIELD

)

I, WALLACE A. LEE, being first duly sworn, upon my oath
depose and say that the facts set forth in the foregoing Complaint
are true and complete, to the best of my knowledge, information,
and belief.

WALLACE

Subscribed and sworn to before me th
1989.

•WJa.

is

o22

-th

day of July,

%'?)/a^)

NOTARY PUBLIC
My Commission Expires

Residing At:

2-25-1990

-3-

Panguitch, Utah

Garfield County Sheriff Department
4.03 Court Cases and Appearances
(1J Brployees shall not negotiate ony oorrprunise or arrangement permitting
r*ny person to escape the penalty of the iuv cxr for any reason interfere with the
court of justice. This shall not prevent any errployee from cooperating with the
County Attorney in te interest of justice.
(2) Deputies appearing in cases before the courts shall be punctual.
•Jliey shall dress in uniform.
(3} Deputies shall properly prepare cases with which they are involved
-*7rl shall arrange for presentation in court of all property to be used as
evidence.
(4) At all times employees shall testify with accuracy and truth and
conduct themselves in a professional manner and in accordance with the law
enforcement code of ethics.
4.04 Search and Rescuse Operations
Search and rescue operations shall not be initiated by employees without
tha approval of the Sheriff or Chief Deputy. In lefe-threatening situations,
the deputy shall act in the best interest of the victim, notifying supervisors
as soon as possible.
4.05 Vehicle Inventories
(1) Any vehicle impounded shall be inventoried. A written inventory stall
be made of all contents of vehicle, both in opened, closed and/or looted containers.
The truck and also any oenpartments shall be opened and the contents inventoried.
All evidence seized in any inventory shall be placed in the evidence locker. Such
:oeccccd shall become a part of the case file. When custody of the vehicle changes
from one person to another, the person taking custody of the vehicle shall also
assume custody of the. contents by placing his/her signature on the inventory list.
(2) When a vehicle is removed on a hold-far-owner basis, immediate steps
shall be taken to locate the owner and inform him of the location of the vehicle
and hew he may regain possession. If the owner cannot be located with 24 hours,
the vehicle shall be impounded.
(3) When a vehicle is impounded for Driving Under the Influence, inproper
registration, stolen or abandoned, the officer shall jjnreriiately complete a
Utah State Tax Commission impound report and take to the T^LX OanTniss ion (Assessors
Office). After the impound report has been taken care of, the officer shall not
authorize the release of the vehicle without express consent of the T^x Commission
or until the $25.00 ixrpound fee has been paid by the owner of said vehicle.
(4) When an officer takes custody of a vehicle for hold-for-evix3ence, the
officer shall cause notice to be placed on the vehicle stating that the vehicle
is being held as evidence and he shall immediatley advise the Sheriff and the
County Attorney. Such vehicle shall not be released without permission from
the Sheriff or County Attorney.

Policy-and Procedures Manual
(5) Costs of tewing and storage of vehicles shall be the responsibility
of the owner except for lz::»V.for-evi.de.nce c:r/l seized vehicles* In such cases
financial arrangementsftx:c'zcfzvsje charges nrauid be made through the County
Attorney or the Sheriff- i\r»y vcliicle impounded and r;tored at the Sheriff's
Impound, lot shall be sufcoc::': to n minimum charge of $3.00 per calonder day.
Storage fees to begin on the second day of impound.
{fi) All vehicle keys r»hu2J. rt£main with the vehicle and shall be surrendered to the owner or driver at the time the vehicle is released.
4.06 Hazardeous Materials &nergency Response
(i) The first officer dispatched to a hazardeoi:s materials emergency will
approach and remain upwiixi(if possible) a safe distance from the spill.
(2) The officer will secure the scene and set up a command post at which
location dispatch will send all responding units for guidance.
(3) If the container is on fire, withdraw from the area, call for trained
personnel, and consider area evacuation.
(4) In all cases , the incident should be handled by trained hazardeous
materials responders if possible.
(5) Once substance is identified and if there is no leaking product, no
smoke or fire, and minor damage to container, first responder can then approach
with caution.
(6) Any fire units, antoulances, or wreckers called on the scene are to be
advised of the hazardeous situation at once.
4.07 Domestic

Disputes

It is the policy of the Garfield County Sheriff that in the event of a
domestic dispute, two(2) officers will respond, even if an officer has to be
called out.
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DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH

Hill'

STATE HEALTH LABORATORY
PUBLIC SAFETY TOXICOLOGY SECTION
4-1 Mcclic.il Drive. Sail Lake Cily. U u h 8-111.'1

TOXICOLOGY REPORT
Agency:
Suspect(s):

Officer:

Laboratory No.

GARFIELD S.O.

Your Agency Case No.

STERGER, MICHAEL A.

SHAWN DRAPER

L89-0831

- 1Y4

LABORATORY FINDINGS:

Blood Alcohol:

Negative

BLOOO THC
BLOOO COOH-THC METABOLITE =

2.6 nanograms per milliliter
28 nanograms per milliliter

Analyzed by Wm. E. Stonebrake
Chief, Public Safety Section

SwGrn and Subscribed to before m c this

01

31

Notary Public
To\ L.ib LK-2 1 o/a:i

day of

A

.

August

1!)

89

